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Introduction
A product market exhibits "personal …t uncertainty" if the consumers of the product have idiosyncratic and uncertain values for it. For example, a purchaser of a lamp may be unsure it will match the home decor; a purchaser of a present for a friend may be unsure of the friend's tastes; a purchaser of clothing from a catalog or online store may be unsure of its true cut or color; a purchaser of a textbook may be unsure about whether she will drop the course; a purchaser of a camera may be unsure if its controls will suit her hands. In each case the customer is uncertain of her value for the good, and di¤erent ones are likely to have di¤erent values. In each case it is not the common-value quality of the product, privately known to the seller or otherwise, that is uncertain, but rather the …t of the product to the speci…c customer who purchased it.
A consumer can often evaluate the …t of a product quickly once it is in her possession, without fully consuming it. This learning opportunity is socially bene…cial if the product is returned to the seller when the consumer's subsequent value for it is less than that of the seller. It may also be a source of additional pro…t, since the seller can increase demand for trial usage by o¤ering a money back guarantee of satisfaction. We interpret such a guarantee broadly as a promise to refund a speci…ed amount of the purchase price if the product is returned within a certain period of time. The refund is paid with "no questions asked," since subjective satisfaction is unveri…able. Money back guarantees are ubiquitous in consumer markets, especially in the United States. Indeed, the return option they create is often used: approximately six percent of all retail goods are returned in the United States, 1 and far more in internet and catalog retailing. 2 Our point of departure is the observation that consumers increasingly have ways of learning about their values for products before they purchase them. For example, in order to better estimate personal …t, a consumer can read descriptions and reviews on the internet and in magazines. She can consult experts and friends who purchased the good in the past, and she can devote time to studying her own needs. Our purpose in this paper is to identify the e¤ects of such ex ante research options on a seller's choice of refund and purchase price.
An inital question, however, is whether it is more e¢ cient for a consumer to learn 1 ex ante about her …t to a good, or to instead use the good on a trial basis. The answer depends on the relative costs and accuracies of the two information channels.
A consumer's cost of ex ante research is likely to be greater than her cost of trying the good -the latter cost could even be negative if the good yields a bene…t during the trial period. On the other hand, the cost of producing the good is saved if the consumer forgoes purchasing when she learns ex ante that she has a low value for it.
A pro…t-maximizing seller has an additional reason to want the consumers to stay uninformed. For, if they privately learn their values ex ante, the consumers who decide to purchase will receive an information rent that cuts into the seller's share of the surplus. Consequently, if the seller could simply choose whether its customers are ex ante informed of their values, it would sometimes choose to have them uninformed when e¢ ciency would prescribe that they become informed.
The seller can induce the consumes to stay uninformed by promising a generous refund for returns. However, a refund is an imperfect instrument for this purpose, for two reasons. First, refunds that are too large decrease the total surplus by generating too many returns. Second, in order to keep consumers from wanting to become informed, they may have to be charged a low purchase price and hence be given a sizable share of the surplus anyway. These forces lower the seller's incentive to keep consumers uninformed. They may even cause the seller to prefer to induce its customers to become informed, by not o¤ering a guarantee, despite the resultant loss of information rent.
We study a simple model that delineates these forces and their e¤ects. A …rm produces a discrete product for a mass of risk neutral consumers with unit demands. Each consumer's value for the good is initially unknown, but she can learn it either before purchasing at some cost, or during a trial period after purchasing. For various parameter con…gurations, we determine the …rm's optimal price and refund, whether the consumers become informed, and the nature of the resulting ine¢ ciency.
The …rm's optimal scheme depends upon the information cost to the consumers of becoming ex ante informed of their values. When the information cost is relatively low, the …rm o¤ers no refund and the consumers become informed. However, the seller may still need to charge a price lower than the usual monopoly price for informed consumers.
The latter price can be so high that if it were to be charged, the consumers would prefer not to purchase. The …rm then charges a lower price that just makes the consumers willing to become informed.
When the information cost is in an intermediate range, the …rm induces the consumers to stay uninformed. It does this by o¤ering a refund that is larger than the 2 salvage value of a return. The excessive refund generates an ine¢ ciently large number of returns. This result is in accordance with the generous refunds and large numbers of returns seen in some markets.
At the end we brie ‡y consider two kinds of extension. The …rst allows consumers to receive a bene…t from using the product during the trial period, as when a television set is purchased the day before the Super Bowl game. Including this bene…t does not a¤ect the magnitude of optimal refunds, but it does expand the set of situations in which refunds are o¤ered. The second kind of extension is to a more competitive environment.
Related Literature
A small literature studies monopoly selling schemes for goods with personal …t uncertainty resolved by post-purchase consumer learning. In such a setting, Davis et al. (1995 Davis et al. ( , 1998 consider the use of full money-back refunds to increase demand, and of "hassle" costs to limit the number of returns. Che (1996) shows that a monopoly may o¤er a full refund as a way of providing insurance to risk averse consumers. Fruchter and Gerstner (1999) show that "satisfaction-guaranteed" refunds, which are equal to the purchase price plus the hassle costs of making a return, are sometimes more pro…table than full money back refunds or zero refunds. Chu et al. (1998) show that optimal refunds may be partial if consumers bene…t from the product during the trial period. 3 The details of our model di¤er from those of these papers, and we address some di¤erent issues (e.g., e¢ ciency). The main di¤erence, however, is our introduction of ex ante research by consumers, which provides an entirely di¤erent rationale for refunds.
The only paper we know that considers a second way for consumers to learn their values is Heiman et al. (2001) , a marketing paper which compares the pro…tability of pre-purchase product demonstrations to those of money back guarantees.
Our model can be viewed broadly as a contribution to the literature on mechanisms that prevent, encourage, or determine information acquisition, such as Cremer and Khalil (1992), Lewis and Sappington (1997) , Cremer et al. (1998a,b) , and Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) . It also relates to studies of how much information a seller should directly provide buyers about their personal values, such as Lewis and Sappington (1994) , Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2002) , and Eso and Szentes (2004) .
More narrowly, the model can be viewed as developing a suggestion by Barzel (1982) that sellers may sometimes want to prevent buyers from acquiring information. This suggestion is also pursued in Barzel et al. (2004) in a model of IPO policies. An underwriter "stabilizes" an IPO by promising to agree to buy back a certain fraction of the shares from the buying investors at the IPO price. This is analogous to a stochastic contract in our framework that randomizes between a zero and a full refund. Barzel et al. (2004) show that if the underwriter wants to deter buyers from acquiring information, its optimal stabilization policy pays the full refund with positive probability.
Lastly, we warn the reader of two literatures that may appear more related than they are. The …rst is about how aggregate uncertainty in consumer demand can cause a manufacturer to o¤er a refund to retailers for ordered but unsold inventory, as in Marvel and Peck (1995) , Kandel (1996) , and Padmanabhan and Png (1997) . Although we brie ‡y interpret our model (in Section 7) as one in which a manufacturer wholesaler sells to a competitive retail sector, it has no aggregate uncertainty.
The other seemingly related literature is on warranties, which focuses on product quality rather than personal …t uncertainty. This literature generally considers situations in which evidence of low quality, such as product breakdown, is veri…able.
Although the distinction is not sharp and not always followed, warranties have been distinguished from guarantees in so far as they specify replacement, repair, or refunds for products that veri…able non-performance, not refunds for subjective dissatisfaction (e.g., Davis et al., 1995 Davis et al., , 1998 . The vast literature on warranties has viewed them as devices that, e.g., provide insurance against product failure (Heal, 1977) ; signal a seller's private information about product quality (Grossman, 1981; Lutz, 1989; Moorthy and Srinivasan, 1995; Shieh, 1996) ; screen heterogenous consumers (Matthews and Moore, 1986; Mann and Wissank, 1989) ; and deal with moral hazard (Cooper and Ross, 1985) .
In contrast, we focus on markets in which dissatisfaction is subjective, consumers are risk neutral, sellers have no informational advantage, and consumers are not heterogenous in a way that allows a screening menu to be used.
Structure of the Paper
The environment is described in Section 2, and the e¢ cient benchmark in Section 3. The …rm's optimal choice of price and refund are derived in Sections 4 and 5. Welfare and comparative statics are discussed in Section 6. Extensions to allow for trial-period bene…ts and for competition are considered in Section 7. 8 concludes. Appendix A contains some proofs, and Appendix B an example. 4
Environment
The set of agents is a unit mass (continuum) of potential buyers, and a …rm that sells them a discrete good. For now, we have in mind a retailer and its customers.
Consumers
Each consumer wants at most one unit of the good. Her use value for it,  is drawn from a distribution  that has a positive and di¤erentiable density,  on [0 1] with mean  An informed consumer knows her value for the good when she decides whether to purchase it, and an uninformed consumer does not. No consumer's value is observed by another party.
An uninformed consumer who purchases the good learns her value for it during an initial trial period. For now, a consumer is assumed to receive no bene…t from the good during the trial period. She bears a return cost of  0 if she tries the good and then returns it to the seller.
A consumer with value  who purchases the good for price  receives utility   if she keeps it, gross of any cost she might have borne to become informed. If she instead returns the good for a refund her utility is   All consumers are ex ante identical and uninformed. Once a consumer knows the set of contracts available in the market, she chooses whether to pay an information cost,  0 in order to become informed ("acquire information").
Firm
The …rm has a constant unit cost of procuring the good,   0 It is either the cost of directly producing the good, or of obtaining it from a wholesaler.
The …rm has a gross salvage value, for a returned good. It is the maximum amount the …rm is willing to pay for a return, and so it cannot exceed the …rm's cost of producing a new unit. In general should be less than  : if a return is resold, is equal to the cost  that is saved when a returned rather than a new unit is used to make a sale, less the necessary refurbishing, restocking, and storing costs. We assume  We also assume   so that the gross salvage value of a return exceeds a consumer's cost of making a return after trying the good out.
Most of the results depend on the (net) salvage value of a return,    In terms of it, the parameter assumptions 0    become the following: Assumption 1.    0 and   0
Contracts
The gross refund paid by the …rm for a return is. The (net) refund the consumer receives is the gross bene…t less the cost of trying and returning,    We assume the gross refund cannot be negative, which is equivalent to   A refund contract is a pair ( ) consisting of the purchase price  and the net refund  We assume the …rm will lose money if it o¤ers a gross refund greater than the purchase price. Unlike the cost  of returning the good after trying it, a consumer's cost of returning the good immediately after purchasing it is presumably negligible. Hence, o¤ering a gross refund greater than the price would create a money pump in which consumers purchase and return large numbers of the good, creating a loss for the …rm.
Such consumer arbitrage is prevented if and only if  4 Combining this no-arbitrage constraint with nonnegativity yields a feasibility constraint on the net refund:
Three speci…c kinds of contracts are worth naming.
(a) A no-refund contract is any ( ) with  0 It generates no returns, and is equivalent to selling the good without a guarantee, i.e., to the contract ( )
that has a gross refund =  +  = 0
(b) A full-refund contract is one in which the gross refund is equal to the purchase price. It takes the form, ( ) = (  ) so that =  A full-refund contract is optimal when the no-arbitrage part of (FE) binds.
(c) A (full) satisfaction-guaranteed contract has the form ( ) so that the gross refund is =  +  Such a contract entirely eliminates the downside risk of a purchase, and satis…es (FE) if and only if  = 0
Payo¤s
An uninformed consumer returns the good if and only if she learns during the trial period that her value for it is less than the net refund o¤ered for a return. The most she is willing to pay for the good, when it is bundled with a promised refund  is thus
In Subsection 6.2 below we consider a weaker no-arbitrage condition.
6
Integrating by parts yields
The …rst term in (1) is the consumer's expected (use) value for the good, and the second is her value for the return option generated by the guarantee. Her marginal value for an increase in the refund is  0  () =  () the probability that she returns the good. When o¤ered a contract ( ) an uninformed consumer purchases only if    () The …rm's expected pro…t is then
An informed consumer, on the other hand, does not care about the refund guarantee.
She purchases the good only if she knows she will keep it, and only if her value exceeds the price. Given that she pays  to become informed, her ex ante expected utility is   ()  when the price of the good is  where   () is her information rent:
Integrating this by parts and comparing to (1) establishes that
Becoming informed when the price is  is payo¤ equivalent to staying uninformed when o¤ered the satisfaction-guaranteed contract ( )
O¤ering the good for price  to an informed consumer yields expected pro…t
We assume the following for convenience.
Assumption 2.  ( ) has a unique maximizer,    and 0
E¢ cient Contracts and Outcomes
In order to establish the e¢ cient benchmark, we start at the two possible interim stages following an information acquisition decision, and then turn to that decision itself.
Informed Consumers
Suppose the consumers have become informed. Then e¢ ciency requires the good to be delivered to precisely those whose values exceed the production cost, i.e., to each consumer with value   This outcome is achieved by o¤ering any contract that speci…es  =  Given that the consumers have become informed, the amount of the promised refund is irrelevant because they do not return the good.
The maximal expected surplus that can be generated when the consumers have become informed, net of the cost of becoming informed, is
Uninformed Consumers
Suppose now that the consumers have stayed uninformed. A consumer who then obtains the good and learns her value is  generates a surplus of  or  depending on whether she returns the good. E¢ ciency requires it to be returned if   . The resulting surplus is max( )  The maximal expected surplus generated by giving the good to an uninformed consumer is hence
We take this to be positive, so that it is e¢ cient to produce for the uninformed.
The e¢ cient outcome conditional on the consumers being uninformed is achieved by o¤ering a contract that speci…es the refund  =  so that precisely those consumers with values less than  will return the good, and a price    () so that they purchase the good. Among the e¢ cient contracts for an uninformed consumer that yield nonnegative payo¤s, ( ) is the best for the consumers, giving the …rm zero pro…t, and (  () ) is the best for the …rm, giving it a pro…t equal to the entire surplus   
E¢ cient Information Acquisition
It is e¢ cient for the consumers to become informed if   () exceeds    Equating the two and solving for  yields the social value of ex ante information:
The consumer should become informed if     and stay uninformed if    
The formula for the value of information  can be derived in a more intuitive way.
Learning a consumer's value for the good ex ante allows the mistake of producing the good for her when her value is less than the production cost to be avoided. When her value is  the net cost of this mistake is  max( ). The most that should be paid for the information is the expected cost of this mistake,
Achieving E¢ ciency
We have seen that the contract ( ) achieves an e¢ cient outcome conditional on either information acquisition decision. It also gives the consumers the entire surplus that can be generated by that decision:   () if they become informed, and   if they stay uninformed. They therefore acquire information e¢ ciently when o¤ered ( ), and the resulting outcome is fully e¢ cient.
Other contracts also achieve e¢ ciency. If   , any contract with  =  and   does so, since lowering the refund from  will only strengthen the consumers incentive to become informed. If     e¢ ciency is achieved by any contract with  =  and a price low enough that the consumers will stay uninformed and purchase.
E¢ ciency would be achieved if there were multiple …rms competing in Bertrand fashion. Speci…cally, suppose the …rms simultaneously and publicly o¤er contracts, and then each consumer decides whether to become informed, and then whether to purchase and from which …rm. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game are e¢ cient and give the …rms zero pro…t, by the usual undercutting argument. Hence, ( ) is the unique equilibrium contract if     It is also an equilibrium contract if    although then the return option is unused because the consumers become informed. A no-refund contract with price  =  is also an equilibrium contract in this case.
Constrained Pro…t Maximizing
We now consider two constrained pro…t-maximizing programs for the monopoly …rm.
One restricts the set of allowed contracts to those that induce consumers to stay uninformed, and the other to contracts that induce them to become informed. The …rm's optimal policy is later determined by comparing the values of the two programs.
Inducing Consumers to Stay Uninformed
A consumer who is o¤ered a contract ( ) and has stayed uninformed is willing to purchase if and only if the contract satis…es an individual rationality constraint:
She will stay uninformed only if
In words, (9) requires the consumer's cost of becoming informed to exceed the maximum amount she would be willing to pay to become informed. It is convenient to rewrite (9) as a bound on the price,
where  ( ) is de…ned for any ( ) by the following expression: 5
Inequality (IA  ) is the information acquisition constraint for inducing consumers to stay uninformed. Since  is an increasing function, this constraint loosens if  or  increases, so that a larger price can be charged without triggering information acquisition.
The maximal pro…t that can be achieved by inducing consumers to stay uninformed is the value of the following program:
Note that at least one of the two upper bound constraints on the price, (IR  ) and (
Proposition 1 () below characterizes the solution of (P  ) when the information acquisition constraint can be ignored. Observe that if (IA  ) is deleted, the solution is ( ) = (  () ) since this contract achieves, and gives to the …rm, the maximal surplus   =   ()  that can be obtained when the consumers stay uninformed. It satis…es (IA  ) when   ()  ( ) The value of  for which this is an equality is
This proves that (  () ) is the solution when   Proposition 1 () proved in Appendix A, concerns the case    It states that if  is still high enough that the …rm can make pro…t by inducing consumers to stay uninformed, then (IA  ) binds, and the optimal refund exceeds the salvage value.
Proposition 1.
is the unique solution of (P  ) That is, if the consumers' cost of becoming informed is equal to or greater than the threshold  then the maximal pro…t that can be achieved by inducing consumers to stay uninformed is uniquely achieved by the contract
and    That is, if the consumers' cost of becoming informed is below the threshold  and the maximal pro…t that can be achieved by inducing consumers to stay uninformed is positive, then any contract that achieves that pro…t and induces the consumers to stay uninformed makes the consumers indi¤erent about becoming informed, and speci…es a refund greater than the salvage value.
We give here a heuristic argument for why    in part () Suppose the …rm must, in order to deter information acquisition, charge the price  ( ) when it wants to promise a refund  Increasing the refund then generates a marginal bene…t equal to the amount that the increase in the refund allows the price to be raised:
The 'L'denotes "low", as this is the low cost case of Proposition 1 () On the other hand, when  is high as in Proposition 1 () the …rm can charge the maximal price   () without triggering information acquisition. It's marginal bene…t from raising the refund is the amount this price can then be raised:
Observe that for any   0        : needing to actively deter information acquisition increases the …rm's marginal bene…t from raising the refund. The marginal cost of raising the refund is the same in the two cases,   ( ) () and so
The optimal refund is  in the high  case, and so satis…es
This shows that in the low  case, raising the refund above  increases pro…t.
Inducing Consumers to Become Informed
Turning to the problem of maximizing pro…t while inducing consumers to become informed, the …rst constraint is that they should prefer becoming informed to not pur-
The second constraint insures that consumers prefer to become informed rather than to stay uninformed and purchase. A no-refund contract maximizes a consumer's incentive to become informed. Thus, since a refund is also not paid when consumers become informed, we can restrict attention to no-refund contracts. By the arguments in the previous subsection, when they are o¤ered a no-refund contract with a price  the consumers are willing to become informed, rather than to stay uninformed and purchase, only if the following information acquisition constraint holds:
The consumers are willing to become informed if and only if both (IR  ) and (IA  )
are satis…ed. The maximal pro…t that can then be obtained is thus
The constraint set of this program is the area between the two curves in Figure 1 , and to the left of  =   ( ). To verify the …gure, note that  (0 0) = 0 and   (0) = 1;  (0 )
The constraint set is nonempty if and only if    ( ) : the consumers cannot be induced to become informed if doing so costs them more than
The solution is    the unconstrained maximizer of   when  is small enough that
One of the two constraints binds when  is higher. If     the constraint that can bind is (IR  ) and it does so when     (  ) In this case   is so high that if it were to be charged, the consumers would prefer not to purchase than to become informed, but lowering the price would induce them to become informed. The "single-peaked"property of  required by Assumption 2 implies that when      () the solution of (P  ) is   () the price in the constraint set that is closest to    6 These claims are obvious except perhaps for  (0 ( )) =  This identity comes from the de…nition (10), together with the expression ( ) =   0  () implied by (1) and (4). 
The Optimal Contract
We now characterize the …rm's optimal contract. We do so by determining which of the constrained pro…t functions,  () or  () is greater for each value of 
We …rst dispense with the case of high information costs. Recall that if     maximal surplus is largest when consumers stay uninformed: This proves the following lemma.
Thus, for high costs   the …rm prefers to induce consumers to stay uninformed.
By continuity this should be true for somewhat lower costs as well. But if  is quite low, the consumers will want to become informed unless the o¤ered price is quite low and/or the refund quite high. This will make the constrained pro…t  () small. We should thus expect that if  is su¢ ciently low, the …rm will prefer to induce the consumers to become informed. This is true, so long as    But if  =  there is no net cost of producing a good for a consumer who will return it -the social cost of learning one's value by trying the good is zero, and hence less than the cost of becoming ex ante informed for any   0 This causes the …rm to always prefer, when  =  to induce the consumers to stay uninformed. The following lemma con…rms these intuitions. 
and (IR  ) with equality, and (FE). The constraint set of (P  ) is therefore nonempty when  = . This proves
 ( 2 ) If this were an equality, ( 1   1 ) would be a solution for  2 as well as  1  in which case Proposition 1 () would imply
We have three cases to consider:  =  which implies  = 0;    and  = 0; and    and   0 The last case is easiest:
if   0 the only contract in the constraint set of (P  ) when  = 0 is the zero-price no-refund contract (0 ) It yields pro…t  0 proving that (0)  0 in this case.
Turning now to the …rst two cases, suppose  = 0 Then the constraint set of (P  ) when  = 0 consists of all satisfaction-guaranteed contracts with  0 From (2) and (5), we obtain the identity  ( ) =  () ( ) () Thus, 
Welfare and Comparative Statics
In this section we draw out some of the welfare and comparative static implications of Theorems 1 and 2. We discuss separately the cases of information costs that are high, medium, and low:     2 ( ) and  2 (0 ) respectively.
High Information Costs
When    the …rm achieves an e¢ cient outcome by o¤ering the contract (  () ) Consumers stay uninformed and purchase, which is optimal since     The e¢ cient number of returns are obtained because the refund is equal to the salvage value of a return. The purchase price increases in the net salvage value,  =  and is independent of the other parameters except 
Medium Information Costs
When  2 ( ) the …rm induces the consumers to stay uninformed, and it does so by promising a refund that exceeds the salvage value of a return. This generates an ine¢ ciently large number of returns.
The …rm o¤ers a full-refund contract only if the no-arbitrage constraint,  +   binds in (P  ) As this is impossible when    8 in this case a partial refund is optimal.
(This bound is not tight -partial refunds are optimal if   is positive but not too large.) 8 By Theorem 2 and (10),  =  (  )  +  Hence,    +  when    Turning to comparative statics, recall that in the present case the optimal contract solves (P  ) and that (IA  ) binds. So  ( ) can be substituted for  to eliminate a constraint and variable. We can also dispense with the nonbinding constraint   Hence, (   ) is optimal if and only if  =  (  ) and  solves the following program:
When the constraints do not bind, the …rst-order condition (using
where  =  ( ) We can view (13) 
It is convenient now to assume a relatively weak regularity condition, 9 Then (FE ) binds, and the optimal contract is a full-refund contract. As  increases the optimal contract remains a full-refund contract, sliding leftward down the  (  ) curve.
Thus, in this region, the optimal price   and so the gross refund =   as well as the net refund   all decrease in  Shifting curves in the …gure also reveals that when (FE ) binds,    0 and    0 11 and   =   = 0
The following table summarizes the predicted changes in the optimal contract for each increase in a parameter, given
We make two comments about these comparative statics predictions. First, without the underlying model of information acquisition deterrence, it would be surprising to see the price and refund move in opposite directions, as is predicted in Table 1 in the unconstrained case when  changes. One would have instead expected the refund and price to be co-monotone, reasoning that when a smaller refund is promised, demand decreases and so a lower price should be charged. Here, however, the information acquisition constraint prevents the …rm from charging as high a price and promising as low a refund as it would otherwise do. An increase in  loosens this constraint, allowing the …rm to move both variables as desired, the price up and the refund down.
Second, the predictions when (FE  ) bind have special import because they apply to the many markets in which full refunds are prevalent. And they too are somewhat surprising. For example, consider the result that the refund increases in . One might have expected that when consumers …nd it more costly to become informed, the …rm should lower the refund because it can now do so without triggering information acquisition.
Here, however, a contract is optimal only because the information acquisition constraint prevents the price from being raised, and the no-arbitrage constraint prevents the refund from being raised. An increase in  weakens the information acquisition constraint, thereby allowing the …rm to raise the price without triggering information acquisition, and the higher price weakens the no-arbitrage constraint, thereby allowing the refund to be raised as well. A similar explanation applies to the result that when (FE  ) binds, the gross refund, =  +  decreases in  Remark. The result that full refunds are optimal for a range of parameters -those for which (FE  ) binds -depends on the form of the no-arbitrage constraint we have assumed,  In some cases this constraint may take other forms. Suppose, for example, that a consumer must pay  whenever she returns the product, even if she has not tried it. 12 The no-arbitrage constraint should then be   and so (FE  )
becomes   ( ) This weaker constraint never binds in (P  ) (by the logic of footnote 8, with  = 0) Hence, full refunds are now optimal only in knife-edge cases, and an optimal refund can be more than full,    The optimal contract now always satis…es the comparative statics results obtained above for when (FE  ) is nonbinding.
Low Information Costs
When  2 [0 ) the …rm induces consumers to become informed. No refunds are paid, no goods are returned, and too few goods are sold because    (else pro…t would not be positive).
The comparative statics in this case are simple. The optimal price depends only on  and  It is either the unconstrained monopoly price   for informed consumers, which is constant in  and increasing in  or it is   () which is constant in  and decreases in  The price is never greater than    since it is equal to   () if and only if this amount is less than    When   () is the optimal price, a lowering of their cost of becoming informed does not bene…t the consumers, since the …rm just raises the price enough to keep them indi¤erent about purchasing.
Comparative Statics of  and 
We now determine how the interval of medium information costs, ( ) varies with the parameters. This allows one to determine how an economy-wide change a¤ects the number of product markets in which consumers are induced to stay uninformed by excessive refunds.
The upper endpoint  of this interval is explicitly de…ned by (11) It depends only on  and  and it decreases in  13
The lower endpoint  is more interesting. Note that program (P  ) depends on (  ) and (P  ) depends on  So in general  depends on all these parameters, since it is determined by the equation
At  both functions are continuous,  is strictly increasing in  and  is nonincreasing in  (see Lemma 2 and its proof). Thus, any change in ( ) that raises (lowers)  will lower (raise) 
We therefore see that  = (  ) decreases in  since  increases in  We also see that  does not locally depend on  when (FE ) does not bind in (P  ) in a neighborhood
20 of  i.e., when at  the optimal refund that induces consumers to stay uninformed is a partial one. If it is instead a full refund, then raising  tightens the binding constraint (FE ) and so lowers  and increases 
To derive the sign of  note …rst that    = 1 since the objective function of (P  ) is   ( ) () and the constraints do not depend on  The constraints of (P  ) also do not depend on  and it's objective function is ( )(1  ()) The envelope theorem yields
which is positive because     0 and    0 14
The following table summarizes how  and  change when the parameters increase.
Observe that the interval of information costs ( 1) for which refunds are o¤ered expands if  decreases, or if  decreases and optimal refunds at  are full refunds, or if  increases. Thus, if economy-wide e¢ ciency gains lower production costs, lower the transaction costs of returning products, or lower the cost of processing returns for salvage, refunds should be o¤ered for more products.
Ine¢ cient Information Acquisition
Recall that the e¢ cient information acquisition decision depends on whether  exceeds   Thus, when       the …rm induces consumers to stay uninformed, but they would become informed in the e¢ cient outcome. The optimal refund is not only too large given that the consumers have stayed uninformed (  ) but it is also too large relative to the zero refund that would be …rst-best e¢ cient.
The opposite is true when      The …rm then induces consumers to become informed, but they would stay uninformed in the e¢ cient outcome. It is more pro…table in this case to induce information acquisition, because the recovery of the cost of producing the good for low-valued consumers outweighs the loss of giving the purchasing informed consumers an information rent. Observe that in this case, the …rm o¤ers a refund that is too small (zero) relative to the e¢ cient refund,  =  Both types of ine¢ ciency can occur. Examples are given in Appendix B which show that  can lie to either side of 
Extensions
We sketch here two extensions of the model. The …rst is to allow consumers to receive a bene…t from the good in the trial period -the case of prom dresses the day before the senior prom, or television sets the day before the Super Bowl. The second is to settings with competing …rms.
Trial Period Bene…ts
We incorporate trial period bene…ts by simply assuming each consumer receives an expected bene…t of   0 from using the good during the trial period. While it may be random ex ante, this bene…t is uncorrelated with the consumer's value  that she will obtain in the post-trial period if she keeps the good. A more general pre and post-trial period bene…t structure is beyond our scope here. 15 The expected bene…t  appears in the model as a constant added to a consumer's payo¤ when she purchases. It does not a¤ect her return decision, which remains based on a comparison of the refund  to the post-trail period value . Consequently, the inclusion of these trial period bene…ts does not alter the level of optimal refunds. It does, however, expand the set of situations in which a refund is o¤ered. We sketch here the arguments for these results.
Consider program (P  ) An uninformed consumer o¤ered a contract ( ) will purchase only if    () +  so that this is the new (IR  ) constraint. Her payo¤ if she were to become informed is   ( )  since an informed consumer now purchases when    It is easy to show that she prefers staying uninformed if and only if   ( )+ and so this is the new (IA  ) constraint. Since one of these two constraints must bind, the only change to the solution of (P  ) is that the optimal price increases by . The optimal refund is unchanged, as is the upper bound  on the interval of medium information costs. The new pro…t function  shifts up by  Turning to program (P  ) its objective function is now ( )(1  ( )) Its constraints (IR  ) and (IA  ) are now    () +  and   (0 ) +  respectively. If neither binds, the new optimal price is larger than before, but the increase in pro…t  is is less than  16 Even if one of the constraints binds, so that the inclusion of  does cause the optimal price to increase by   still increases by less than  because not all consumers purchase.
We thus see that the increasing function  () increases by  and the nondecreasing function  () increases by less than  Hence, the point  at which the two are equal decreases in  The addition of trial period bene…ts therefore expands both the interval of information costs ( 1) at which a refund is o¤ered, and the interval ( ) at which an excessive refund is o¤ered. The magnitude of the refunds that were o¤ered in the absence of the trial period bene…ts are una¤ected.
Competition
We have assumed the …rm is a monopoly, which may be inappropriate for situations in which close substitutes for the …rm's product are produced by other …rms. However, as is commonly true of monopoly results, we view ours as suggestive of those that should obtain in more complicated models of monopolistic competition. This makes sense even if we interpret the …rm in the model as a consumer retailer, since the size and dominance of retailers like K-Mart or Circuit City certainly indicate that they have market power.
The argument of Diamond (1961) seems particularly compelling for retailing; when it applies, a seller has monopoly power because consumers do not know the price and refund it o¤ers until they arrive at the store, and their cost of conducting another search at a competing seller is positive.
Another way of introducing retail competition is to assume the …rm is a wholesaler, selling the good to competing retailers that then sell it to the consumers. The …rm uses a variant of consignment selling: it sells the good to the retailers together with the promise to pay a refund for the goods that the consumers return to them. The retailers then compete in a Bertrand fashion, each one publicly o¤ering a refund contract to attract consumers. As noted in Section 3, this kind of competition yields the retailers zero pro…ts, and the retail outcome is e¢ cient. However, the procurement cost of the retailers is the price they are charged by the wholesaler for product, and their salvage value for a consumer return is the refund the wholesaler subsequently pays when the good is returned to it. The equilibrium retail price is thus equal to the price the wholesaler charges the retailers, and the equilibrium refund is equal to the refund the wholesaler pays to retailers. The wholesaler consequently acts as though it were selling directly to consumers, and the results of the model apply immediately. (The details of this argument are in Matthews and Persico, 2005) .
Concluding Remarks
To summarize quickly, we have presented a model in which, if the cost to consumers of learning ex ante their personal …t to a product lies in an intermediate range, the seller will induce them to remain uninformed by o¤ering a guarantee of satisfaction that speci…es an excessive refund. The refund is then larger than the seller's salvage value for a return, and it therefore generates an ine¢ ciently large number of returns.
The extent to which refunds and returns are excessive awaits careful empirical study.
In our view, it is very plausible that they are excessive for many products. Refunds are often patently generous, 17 and retailers view returns as costly. 18 Logically, those commonly-seen refunds that o¤er full money back must exceed the seller's salvage value for a return: positive pro…t implies that a product's purchase price should exceed its procurement cost, and the latter should exceed the salvage value because the seller should be unwilling to pay more for a return than the cost of procuring a new unit. For the model of this paper to have force, excessive refunds should be found for products about which consumers could learn their values by exerting ex ante e¤ort, but they choose instead to stay largely uninformed.
We do not claim, however, that the suppression of information acquisition is the only rationale for excessive refunds. Refunds may be excessive for di¤erent reasons in di¤erent settings. For example, if there are two types of consumer, one that is exogenously informed and one that is exogenously uninformed, the seller may want to o¤er a large refund to the uninformed in order to charge them a price large enough to 1 7 In a survey of 133 Sacramento area retail stores, Davis et al. (1998) found that sixty percent of the department chain stores, and nineteen percent of the single outlet specialty stores, o¤ered full money back with no restrictions. In the data that Chu et al. (1998) present for computer mail-order stores, forty percent of the stores o¤ered full money back (not including shipping), while the rest deducted 10-20% of the purchase price as a restocking fee.
1 8 "Returns have been regarded by online retailers as an unwanted headache, and all too frequently, an expensive one. Gartner Inc.'s Gartner G2 Retail Services Group estimates that returns are costing retailers anywhere from 0.2% to as much as 25% of sales. Forrester Research has estimated that next year, retailers will spend $9 billion to process some $11.5 billion in returned goods purchased online."("Dealing For each rationale there is probably a setting in which it has merit.
In our view the most interesting and robust result of the model is that sometimes …rms want to induce consumers to stay uninformed, and they do so by promising large refunds. We do not, however, wish to emphasize the ancillary result that a …rm o¤ers a no-refund contract generating no returns when it wants to induce consumers to become informed. This no-refund no-return result obtains in the model because its informed consumers do not return the good when they purchase it. But if a consumer could only become imperfectly informed ex ante, and then learn more during the trial period, she might sometimes return the good if promised a refund. The seller might then o¤er a refund that generates returns, even when it induces information acquisition. These refunds, we conjecture, would be small and generate too few returns. We leave this generalization to future work.
1 9 This screening idea is explored in Model SC of the working paper, Matthews and Persico (2005) .
2 0 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
2 1 The endowment e¤ect is studied, e.g., by Kahneman et al. (1990) , and by Plott and Zeiler (2005) .
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Appendix A. Analysis of Program (P  )
Results concerning program (P  ) are derived here, and Proposition 1 () proved.
The constraint set of this program contains  and so is nonempty. Since   ( ) = min(  + ) =  for  1 every such  yields the same pro…t,   ( )(1) =   Thus, since all its functions are continuous, standard arguments show that (P   ) has a solution for each  0, and  is continuous. 
The desired crossing points are
We know   is well-de…ned and greater than  because    implies   () =  ( )   ( );   is well-de…ned and greater than  because Assumptions 1 and 3 imply We show numerically that the …rm's optimal policy in this case is to induce consumers to stay uninformed, and it does so by o¤ering a full refund. Note that Assumptions 1 3 hold for these parameter restrictions.
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In this case, constraint (IR  ) holds in ( A computation now shows that  ()   () for  2 [228 25] We conclude that for each  in this interval, the optimal contract is the full refund contract ( (   )   )
